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THE PROBLEM OF THE INNOCENT CO-INSURED
SPOUSE: THREE THEORIES ON RECOVERY
INTRODUCTION
Arson-for-profit has reached epidemic proportions in this coun-
try. Rapidly becoming a lucrative venture, arson-for-profit accounts
for a significant amount of all arson. The possibility of an immediate
gain through the collection of the insurance proceeds is a primary
motivating factor behind for-profit arson.' In fact, statistical summa-
ries list insurance policyholders as one of six major types of
arsonists.2 Federal fire officials estimate that fires set to collect insur-
ance proceeds account for as much as one-half of the direct annual
cost of arson.' In 1980 alone, the value of property damaged by re-
ported arson was $891 million dollars.4 Statistics demonstrate that
the opportunity to make a quick profit by way of the insurance
policy is a motivating force behind arson-for-profit.
Although federal and local law enforcement programs are being
revamped and improved,' an insurance company's resistance in court
1. In 1977, it was estimated that arson resulted in 1.5 billion dollars in direct
annual costs to insurance companies, and through increased insurance premiums, in-
volves everyone. JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Oct. 25, 1977, at 10. See also, Fighting Arson
by Removing the Profit Motive, Bus. WK., May 21, 1979, at 69, stating that the most
common type of arson for-profit is a "sell out to the insurance companies."
2. Armstrong, The All-Consuming Crime, SATURDAY EVENING POST, March,
1978 at 24. Statistical summaries from insurance companies, fire marshals, and prose-
cutors list the other five major arsonists as follows: underground operators; pyro-
maniacs; revenge seekers; vandals; and fires set to cover other crimes. Id. See generally
Caufield, Arson: Can it be Stopped?, U.S.A. TODAY, July, 1979.
3. Arson in U.S. Reaches a Crisis Stage, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 8,
1981, at 42. Arson directly causes economic damage "through lost businesses, a reduc-
tion in the number of jobs, and the costs of fire fighting and medical care." Fighting
Arson by Removing the Profit Motive, Bus. WK., May 21, 1979, at 68. The indirect
costs of arson have been estimated to be "as high as 15 billion dollars a year in lost tax
revenues and wages, unemployment insurance payments, relocation costs and other
economic ripple effects." Arson in U.S. Reaches a Crisis Stage, supra, at 39.
4. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS - 1980, Sept. 10, 1981, at 35-37.
5. See supra notes 1 and 3. Arson-for-profit accounts for 14 percent of all ar-
sons. See Arson in the U.S. Reaches a Crisis Stage, supra note 3 at 39.
6. See generally Freudenheim, The Most Neglected Crime in the United
States, 7 BARRISTER, 11-14 (1980). Arson has been characterized as the most neglected
crime in this country. Id. For example, the FBI did not consider arson a crime until
1979, when it recategorized arson for investigative purposes as a "Part I" offense,
ranking it in importance with murder, rape and robbery. Before this time, arson was
listed, along with drunkenness and disorderly conduct, as a "Part II" offense. See
supra at 1 and Appendix II. Furthermore, although arson increases at a rate of 25 per-
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to an arsonist's attempt to fraudulently recover the proceeds of his
insurance policy is still a major weapon in the fight against for-
profit arson.' Arson is an elusive crime. It is probably the most dif-
ficult crime to investigate and prove primarily because most of the
evidence is destroyed in the fire.' Once investigations have deter-
mined the fire to have been of incendiary origin, it must be decided
upon whom liability should be imposed.' The existence of a financial
motive renders the policyholder the most likely suspect.' °
Primary factors influencing the decision to defend a fraudulent
insurance claim are the rights and obligations of a co-insured under
the policy, such as a mortgagee, corporation, partner, or spouse."
These factors are considered because the language of the insurance
contract as well as public policy governing recovery vary with the
nature of the relationship between the co-insureds.'2 Particularly
problematic is a determination of the rights of an innocent spouse to
recover the proceeds under a fire insurance policy.'3 Difficulties
have arisen as a result of competing interpretations of the rights
cent annually, only 3 percent of incendiary fires lead to an arrest and less than one
percent result in a conviction. Factors contributing to the low arrest and conviction
rates are the difficulties in detecting and proving arson, lack of manpower and exper-
tise on local police forces, and public apathy and indifference to this costly crime. See
supra note 3.
7. Karp, the wishbone offense-a two-pronged attack against arson, 14
FORUM 205, 205 (1978). See generally Litigation said to be key to reducing arson in-
cidence, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Property ed.), May 8, 1981.
8. For information on the investigation and defense of fire insurance fraud
claims, see Gwertzman, Arson and Fraud Fires, 12 FORUM 827 (1977).
9. Taylor, Updated Guidelines for defending arson for Profit Claims, 14
FORUM 192, 195 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Taylor].
10. See supra note 8 at 832-33. Gwertzman notes that a number of police and
fire officials believe that careless writing of insurance policies (e.g., property insured in
excess of value) is partly to blame for the increase in for-profit arsons. Id. at 834. See
also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
11. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 195-98. Although the primary purpose of this
note is to analyze the rights of an "innocent" spouse under a fire insurance policy,
other types of relationships will be addressed by analogy. Because a mortgagee's right
to recover under an insurance policy is dependent upon the nature of the applicable
provision in the contract, ie., either a "loss payable" clause which constitutes an
assignment of the named insured's rights, or a "standard" clause which constitutes a
separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagor, a discussion of the mort-
gage situation specifically has been omitted. See, e.g., West v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 63 Mich. App. 279, 234 N.W.2d 485 (1975), rev'd, 359 N.W.2d 556 (1977) (per
curiam); Rent-A-Car v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 158 Md. 169, 148 A. 252 (1930).
12. See supra note 11.
13. Comment, Arson Fraud: Criminal Prosecutions and Insurance Law, 7
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 605 (1979).
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and obligations of married persons under a joint fire insurance
policy.
Several theories of the innocent spouse's right to recover have
been forwarded. Traditionally, when the property was jointly owned,
the fraudulent act of either spouse barred recovery under the policy
by the innocent spouse."4 Other courts have allowed the innocent
spouse to recover regardless of whether the property interests were
joint or severable."6
Public policy considerations also play an important part in the
determination of an innocent spouse's right to recover. While courts
are reluctant to impute fraud on an innocent party," they adhere to
the age-old tenet that a wrongdoer cannot benefit from his own
wrong. 8 Since the arsonist and the innocent co-insured are married,
complicity is immediately suspected because of the intimate nature
of the marital relationship. 9 Furthermore, anachronistic views of the
marital relationship, especially where the property is owned as
tenants by the entirety, have complicated the determination,2' as
well as the valuation,2 of the innocent spouse's interests under the
insurance policy.
14. See, e.g., Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423
(1938); Matyuf v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 27 Pa. D.C.2d 351 (1933); Jones v. Fidelity & Guard
Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). But cf. Varano v. Home Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 164 Pa. Super. 228, 63 A.2d 97 (1949) (recovery allowed where property was
jointly owned, but parties were unrelated and maintained separate policies).
15. See, e.g., Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, 363 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1978); Ryan
v. M.F.A. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 610 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
16. See, e.g., Lovell v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 302 N.C. 150, 274 S.E.2d 170
(1981); Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Ijames v. Republic Ins. Co., 33 Mich. App. 541, 190 N.W.2d 366
(1971), where the court stated that the rule barring recovery to all insureds under the
policy based on the fraud of a co-insured is "harsh and equitable [and that it] may be in
need of re-examination." Id. at __, 190 N.W.2d at 369; Hosey, 363 So. 2d at 754. See
also 5A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE 3594 (Rev. ed. 1970).
18. See e.g., Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 (1898); Fuselier v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 301 So. 2d 681, 682 (La. App. 1974); Jones v. Fidelity
& Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). These cases state that public
policy will not permit recovery by an insured who knowingly burns insured property
in order to collect the insurance.
19. See supra Taylor, note 9, at 197. Cf. Wilson v. Concordia Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (recovery barred when court concluded
husband and wife were joint enterprisers).
20. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Cooperative Fire Ins. Assoc. v. Domina, 137 Vt. 3, 399 A.2d 502
(1979). See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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This note examines the recent changes in the law concerning
the rights of an innocent spouse to recover the proceeds under a fire
insurance policy. An initial review of the nature and construction of
a fire insurance policy will provide an understanding of the basic
principles and policies underlying an insurance contract. Three dis-
tinct theories of recovery, emanating from disagreements as to
whether property or contract law should govern the interpretation
of the policy, will then be examined. An-analysis and comparison of
each theory will demonstrate the impropriety of a property law
theory in ascertaining the innocent spouse's rights under the policy.
However, a strict application of contract law will also prove to be in-
appropriate because insurance contracts are characteristically one-
sided. Therefore, it is proposed that competing policy concerns must
be considered in conjunction with insurance contract principles in
order to determine properly the rights of an innocent spouse. Final-
ly, suggestions will be made as to how some of the practical prob-
lems inherent in the decision to allow recovery may be avoided.
THE NATURE AND CONSTRUCTION OF
FIRE INSURANCE POLICIES
A fire insurance policy is a personal contract of indemnity be-
tween the insurance company and the insured.' Fire insurance does
not insure the property itself;" the proceeds are not a substitute for
the real estate. ' The policy is personal to the extent that it provides
indemnity for loss to an insurable interest. 5 Additionally, the rela-
tionship between the parties is of a purely contractual nature."
Although a majority of the states have statutorily adopted the 1943
New York Standard Fire Policy,' fire insurance must still be treated
22. 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 2107 (Rev. ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Appleman]. See COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 1:49 (1959). See, e.g.,
Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828 (1950).
23. Forsyth County v. Plemmons, 2 N.C. App. 373, __, 163 S.E.2d 97, 99
(1968). 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 22.
24. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50
(1963). "If the insurance proceeds are the logical substitute of anything they are the in-
surance contract and the premiums paid under it." Id. at 85, 192 N.E.2d at 22, 242
N.Y.S.2d at 52.
25. 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 22, at § 2105. See, e.g., Richardson v. Providence
Washington Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 2d 593, 237 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1963). See also KEETON, BASIC
TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 4.6 (1971), for the notion that the trend is away from the
principle that insurance is personal and toward the principle that it is insurance of the
property for whomever may be the owner.
26. 12 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7006 (Rev. ed. 1981).
27. Comment, Arson Fraud Criminal Prosecution and Insurance Law, 7
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"as a voluntary contract which derives its force from the consent of
the parties."2" In fact, insurance contracts traditionally have been
viewed as ordinary contracts.2
There is, however disagreement as to whether a strict applica-
tion of contract law should govern the interpretation of an insurance
policy."0 Indeed, a mechanical application of contract law overlooks
the fact that insurance policies are true contracts of adhesion with
the only choice being to go to another company which will probably
use the standard form.' Insurance policies, like adhesion contracts,
are one-sided bargains in that there is a characteristic absence of
bargaining power on the part of the insured.2 Since the insurance
company, staffed by expert legal counsel, drafts the policy to serve
its best interests, the insured has little opportunity to negotiate or
choose the term of the contract. Because of the inequitable nature
of the insurance contract, the general rule of construction for insur-
ance policies is to construe the contract "strictly against the insurer
and liberally in favor of the insured. 34 Nevertheless, principles of
normal contract interpretation place limitations on this liberal rule
of construction.
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 570 (1979). The following excerpt briefly summarizes the
development and characteristics of a standard fire policy:
Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, state legislatures have
recognized a need for uniformity among fire insurance contracts. In 1943,
the New York Standard Fire Policy became effective, and has been
adopted in identical or substantially similar form since then by approx-
imately forty-five states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. This
Standard Polcy [sic] contains the "165 Lines" which set forth most of the
provisions of the contract. The parties do, however, retain a right to add
conditions not in contravention of the Standard Policy. The 165 Lines and
the endorsements and forms added thereto define the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties, and are inherently involved in the issue of arson for
profit.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
28. 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 22.
29. Schultz, The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract: A Few Sugges-




32. See Hollman, Insurance as a Contract of Adhesion, INs. L.J. 274 (May,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Hollman]. See also Comment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to In-
surance Recovery, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 544-45 n.12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to Insurance Recovery].
33. See Schultz, supra note 29, at 378-79.
34. Hollman, supra note 32, at 279. This rule is applicable to all types of in-
surance policies. Id.
1983]
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Insurance policies, like all contracts, must be reasonably inter-
preted in accordance with the language used. 5 Where the contract is
clear and unambiguous, the rights of the parties are determined
from the express terms of the contract. 8 Where the contract is am-
biguous 7 or capable of two or more interpretations, a construction
will be adopted which favors the insured and avoids forfeiture. 8
Furthermore, the test to be used in interpreting the ambiguous
language of a policy, as stated by one court, is "not what the insurer
intended the words to mean but what a reasonable person in the
position of the insured would understand them to mean."39 Hence,
from the principle of resolving ambiguities against the insurer flows
the broader princples of honoring the reasonable expectations of the
insured.0
Another concept employed in the construction of insurance con-
tracts is the "implied exception."41 An implied exception is a "basis
for an insurer's nonliability that is not expressed anywhere in the
contract but is said to be implicit in the nature of the agreement
and the circumstances to which it applies."4 For instance, the rule of
fortuitousness, which requires that the loss be accidential,43 is an im-
plied exception." It is basically an attempt to prevent fraud against
the insurer, deter crime, and avoid a benefit to the wrongdoer that
35. 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7402 (Rev. ed. 1976). See,
e.g., Marson Coal Co. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 210 S.E.2d 747 (W. Va. 1974).
36. 12 APPLEMAN, supra note 26, at § 7004. See, e.g., G.C. Kohimier, Inc. v.
Mollenhauer, 237 Minn. 126, 140 N.W.2d 47 (1966), rev'd, 243 N.W.2d 134 (1976); RTE
Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 247 N.W.2d 171 (1976).
37. See Schultz, supra note 29, at 379, where the court's tendency t0
"discover" ambiguities is noted.
38. 13 APPLEMAN, supra note 35, at § 7401.
39. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, __, 433
P.2d 795, 798 (1967). APPLEMAN, supra note 35, at § 7401.
40. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
41. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.3(a) (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KEETON].
42. Id. at 278.
43. Id. at § 5.4(a). "In view of the impact of both public policy and contract
provisions, the grounds of decision in precedents concerning the requirement that loss
be fortuitous, . . . are a medley of interpretations of expressed qualifications of
coverage and application of implied exceptions, some based on a theory of interpreta-
tion and some on overriding public policy." Id. at 289.
44. KEETON, supra note 41. Arson is considered to be an implied exception.
However, insurance companies also try to characterize it as an express exception by
including it under the "increase of hazard" clause.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 11
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forms the foundation for this fortuity requirement. 5 Thus, it may be
concluded that much of what governs the interpretation of an insur-
ance policy stems from an acute awareness of the compelling public
policy objectives consistent with the underlying purposes of the in-
surance contract.
This overview of the nature and construction of a fire insur-
ance policy, although brief, provides a basic understanding of the ap-
proaches courts take in addressing the question of an innocent co-in-
sured's right to recover. Although the threshold question in deter-
mining a right to recover appears to be whether the contract is joint
or severable,"' the courts nevertheless demonstrate a fundamental
disagreement as to the nature of the applicable law as well as the
policy concerns involved. This fundamental disagreement among the
courts has generated three separate theories on an innocent co-in-
sured's right to recover under a fire insurance policy.
THREE THEORIES ON THE INNOCENT
CO-INSURED SPOUSE'S RIGHT TO RECOVER
Determining the right of an innocent spouse to recover the pro-
ceeds under a fire insurance policy is a formidable task. Various
competing interests must be reconciled before a cogent theory of re-
covery can be developed. The issue, in most cases," is whether the
fraudulent act of an insured bars recovery by an innocent co-insured
where the property is jointly owned. 8 A hypothetical will best illus-
trates the type of factual situation most often presented to the
courts.
John and Jean Smith own a home as tenants by the en-
tirety. In July, 1981, their home was extensively damaged
by fire. The Smith's were jointly insured against loss by
45. Id.
46. See generally Recent Developments, Innocent Coinsured's Recovery Not
Barred by Fraud of Husband, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 169-74 (1974).
47. In some cases, however, neither the property nor the policy are jointly
owned. See, e.g., Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, 363 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1978) (husband
owned property in fee simple and was the only named insured); Simon v. Security Ins.
Co., 390 Mich. 72, 210 N.W.2d 322 (1973) (husband had stolen wife's personal property
in which she had sole interest); Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d
511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (house belonged to husband and policy was issued to him);
Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d 240, 159 N.W.2d 89 (1968)
(husband owned property subject to his mother's life estate and was only named in-
sured).
48. Annot., 11 A.L.R. 4th 1228 (1982).
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fire under a homeowners' policy issued to them by the
General Casualty Company. The policy contains the same
conditions and exceptions, including the definition of the
word "insured," as the "165 Lines" of the New York Stan-
dard Fire Policy. Mr. Smith filed a fire loss claim with
General in order to collect the proceeds under the policy.
Through subsequent investigations, General dis-
covered that John Smith had intentionally set the fire
and, therefore, denied coverage. Since there was no direct
proof that Mrs. Smith participated in the planned arson,
she was not implicated in her husband's fraudulent act. As
a result, Mrs. Smith filed suit against General Casualty,
claiming that the fraudulent acts of her husband should
not bar her, as an "innocent" co-insured, from recovery
under the policy.
It should be noted that there are variations in the facts. In some
cases, the couple is divorced or the fraudulent spouse dies in the
fire. In others, there are variations in the nature of the property
ownership. Also, sometimes the wife sets the fire. The effect of
these differences on the outcome of the case will be discussed at dif-
ferent points throughout the note.
While the cases are surprisingly similar from a factual stand-
point, courts nevertheless have reached conflicting results in ad-
dressing the question. One point of departure is a fundamental dis-
agreement among the courts concerning the nature of the applicable
law. The question of whether an innocent co-insured may recover
the proceeds under the policy is usually contingent upon a determi-
nation of whether the contract interests are joint or severable. 9 The
courts differ as to whether contract or property law should govern
the interpretation of the co-insureds' interests under the policy.
Another source of conflict manifests itself in the degree of im-
portance placed upon either of two competing public policies. In
reaching their decisions, the courts inevitably must weigh the desire
to avoid a possible benefit to the wrongdoer against that of prevent-
ing the imposition of fraud on an innocent party. At any rate, these
conflicting interests in law and public policy are revealed in three
distinct theories on the innocent spouse's right to recover.
The innocent co-insured spouse's chances of recovering ulti-
49. Id.
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mately depend upon which of the three theories the court adopts.
Under the first theory or the old rule, arson on the part of one
spouse absolutely bars the innocent spouse from recovery.' The
"rebuttable presumption"'" theory allows recovery where the co-
insureds' interests in the property are severable,52 while the third
theory or the new dominant rule permits recovery irrespective of
whether the property interests are joint or several." Each of these
three theories will be discussed in turn.
The Old Rule: An All or Nothing Proposition
Until recently, the general rule was that an innocent co-insured
could not recover the proceeds of a fire insurance policy when the
property covered was intentionally burned by the other insured."
While this principle is rapidly being replaced, it is still followed in a
number of jurisdictions.55 Illustrative of the rationale underlying the
old rule is Matyuf v. Phoenix Insurance Co.," one of the earliest
cases to expound the rule with respect to the marital relationship. 7
50. See infra notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
51. The phrase "rebuttable presumption" refers to the opportunity to rebut
the presumption that the contract is joint by proving the interests in the property to
be separate.
52. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 97 and 99 and accompanying text.
55. The old rule is still followed in Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In all of the states, except Louisiana, the
courts noted that the insured property was jointly owned. See Fuselier v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 301 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1974). In Wisconsin, the rule does
not apply where the fraudulent party was not a named insured. See Shearer v. Dunn
County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d 240, 159 N.W.2d 89 (1968).
56. 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351 (1933).
57. Other early cases dealing with the marital relationship are: Kosior v. Con-
tinental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423 (1938); Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins.
Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Wis.
2d 565, 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959).
The question of the innocent co-insured's right to recover under a fire policy
presented itself as early as 1884 in Monaghan v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co., 53 Mich.
238, 18 N.W. 797 (1884). In Monaghan, Mrs. Monaghan fraudulently made a false proof
of loss statement in order to collect the proceeds of a fire policy under which she and
her three minor children were the named insured. The minor children, who were inno-
cent of any wrongdoing, brought suit to recover under the policy. The Michigan
Supreme Court concluded that the interests under the insurance contract were in-
divisible and, therefore, denied recovery stating "if the right of action has become bar-
red as to one of the joint contractors, it has to all of them." Id. at 804. This case can be
distinguished based on the fact that Mrs. Monaghan was the only adult insured and
the company relied on her. Another early case, often cited by the cases dealing with
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In Matyuf, the court denied recovery to an innocent insured
wife whose husband intentionally burned the jointly-insured prop-
erty. The court held:
When two joint owners of property (especially if they hold
by entireties) are jointly insured by one policy, it is im-
plied, by the very nature and fundamental purpose of the
insurance contract, that both of the assured shall observe
good faith toward the insurer, and that a fraudulent and
felonious burning by either of the joint owners who are
jointly insured is not included within the contemplated
risks."
Other factors in the court's decision to deny recovery were the
policies against a possible benefit to the wrongdoer and the
discouragement of arson-for-profit.59 Further, the court noted in dicta
that if the wife had dealt with the insurer on her own behalf, she
may have been able to recover the full value of her interest because
her husband would have been a stranger to the contract. 0 Thus,
recovery depended upon the form and divisibility of the interests
under the contract coupled with a strong public policy concern.
Under the old rule, courts deny recovery concluding that the
contract is joint,"1 yet are often unclear as to how they arrive at this
decision. Contract law alone is insufficient to support a finding of a
joint contract. Consequently, the courts also rely on the nature of
the property ownership and the marital relationship in order to hold
the interests under the contract joint.
Contract law treats the question of whether a contract is joint
or several as one of interpretation."2 According to the rules of inter-
husband and wives, is Bellman v. Home Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121, 123 (1942)
quoting Caswell v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 252, 149 A. 746, 754 (1930).
58. 27 Pa. D. & C.2d at 365.
59. Id. at 359.
60. Id. at 365. As a practical matter, it is doubtful whether a spouse could ob-
tain fire insurance upon one half of his or her interest in the property. See P. Butler,
Jr., and B. Freeman, Jr., The Innocent Coinsured He Burns It, She Claims- Windfall
or Technical Injustice?, 17 FORUM 187, 209 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Butler &
Freeman, The Innocent Coinsured].
61. Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423 (1938); Matyuf
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351 (1933); Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp.,
250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Klemens v. Badgers Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 565,
99 N.W.2d 865 (1959); Bellman v. Home Ins. Co., 178 Wis. 34, 189 N.W. 1028 (1922).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 112, Comment b, at 258 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1965). In some states, an agreement undertaken by two or more persons is
presumed to be joint. 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 320 (3d. ed. 1959).
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pretation, the nature of an obligation is controlled by the intent of
the parties at the time of the making of the contract.3 Since the in-
surance contract is written in the joint names of the husband and
wife, they are held to be jointly obligated to comply with the terms
of the policy."' This assumes that the creation of a joint contract was
contemplated by the contracting parties and that there is "neces-
sarily a relation of suretyship between them.... While the focal point
of ordinary contract law analysis is the intent of the contracting par-
ties, use of this approach in the construction of a standardized and
unnegotiable contract is problematic."
The express terms of the policy also serve as a basis for deter-
mining contract interests to be joint. 7 Because arson-for-profit is the
basis of an innocent co-insured's claim, an examination of the fraud
clause is essential." When triggered by a fraudulent act of "the in-
sured," the fraud clause relieves the insurer of liability under the
policy." While the policy defines the unqualified word "insured,"7
there is no express definition of the meaning of the phrase "the in-
63. Id. at 651. See Gray v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 104 (Ala.
1974).
64. Mele v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Matyuf v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351 (1933); Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel,
219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d 774 (1979); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 565, 99
N.W.2d 865 (1959).
65. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 925 (West 1952). Contra Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 411 Mich. 267, 307 N.W.2d 53 (1981), rev'g, 91 Mich. App. 49, 282 N.W.2d 829
(1979). In Morgan, the court rejected the insurer's argument that the Michigan stand-
ard fire insurance form intended to impose a mutual obligation of suretyship among
each of several insureds stating that "[sluch an intent is unlikely; as this case aptly l-
lustrates, an insured often has no control over the conduct of others." Id. at -, 307
N.W.2d at 55.
66. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
67. Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423 (1938); Jones
v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Rockingham Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d 774 (1979). The Kosior court specifically
distinguishes those cases in which the insurance contract expressly permitted
severance. Id. at __, 13 N.E.2d at 425. Cf. Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,
252 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (no reference is made to the policy language).
68. Insurers also rely on the "increase of hazard" clause to escape liability
when "the insured" intentionally burns the property. See Winter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 96 Misc. 2d 497, 409 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1978) (involves the "in-
crease of hazard" clause).
69. See supra note 68.
70. Id. The term "insured" may be singular or plural according to the circum-
stances, and may include one or more original promises. 44 C.J.S. INSURANCE § 49
(1945). See Rent-A-Car v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 158 Md. 169, 148 A. 252
(1930).
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sured" as it applies to the fraud clause." Yet the courts following
the old rule encounter few difficulties in defining the term. The
term "the insured" is defined as meaning the "named insured." 2
This explanation of "the insured" is consistent with the interpreta-
tion of a joint policy as creating duties and obligations applicable to
both insureds. Hence, arson by either spouse is "chargeable to the
'named insured' preventing either spouse from recovering any
amount under the policy. '7 3 Furthermore, the denial of recovery is
compatible with the public policy of avoiding a benefit to the wrong-
doer.74
Unfortunately, the courts do not go far enough in their analysis
of the definition of "the insured" under the policy. Equating "the in-
sured" with the express definition of "insured" assumes that the
word "insured" means the same thing throughout the entire policy
regardless of how it is modified."5 At the very least, the term "the
insured" is ambiguous" and, therefore, should be construed in favor
of the insured so as to avoid a forfeiture.77 By avoiding a forfeiture,
71. Comment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to Insurance Recovery, supra note 32,
at 549.
72. Id. This discussion, of course, assumes that the policy in question is iden-
tical or similar to the New York Standard Fire Policy.
73. Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 219 Va. 803, __, 250 S.E.2d 774,
776 (1979). See Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423 (1938);
Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 565, 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959).
74. The public policy of avoiding a benefit to the wrongdoer is broadly ex-
pressed in Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1980), where
the court stated "[t]hat to allow recovery on an insurance contract where the arsonist
has been proven to be a joint insured would allow funds to be acquired by the entity of
which the arsonist is a member and is flatly against public policy". Id. at 590. (Em-
phasis added). In Erlin Lawler Enter., Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 267 Cal. App. 2d 381, 73
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1968), the court looked for an actual benefit to the wrongdoer stating
that "[a]n analysis must be made in each case to see if the arsonist will benefit by
recovery on the policy, either directly or indirectly." Id. at __, Cal. Rptr. at 185. The
court further indicated that if there was no apparent benefit to the wrongdoer, the
corporate entity and the shareholders would be allowed to recover. Id. See Mercantile
Trust Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 376 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1967); Miller v.
Dobrin Furniture Co. v. Camden Fire Ins. Co., 55 N.J. Super. 205, 150 A.2d 276 (1959).
It is interesting to note that Erlin and Miller involved a corporation, and Mercantile
dealt with a trustor-trustee relationship whereas the relationship in Short was a hus-
band and wife.
75. Comment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to Insurance Recovery, supra note 32,
at 549-54. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
76. Assurance Co. v. Bell, 108 Ga. App. 766, 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963); Pawtucket
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lebrecht, 104 N.H. 465, 109 A.2d 420 (1963). Contra G.C. Kohlmier,
Inc. v. Mollenhauer, 237 Minn. 126, 140 N.W.2d 47 (1966), rev'd, 243 N.W.2d 134 (1976).
77. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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the courts effectuate the purpose of an insurance contract which is
to indemnify the insured against loss to an insurable interest. 8 Since
the insured making the claim under the policy is innocent of any
wrongdoing, the purpose of the fraud clause, which excludes
coverage of a loss caused intentionally by "the insured," is not ad-
vanced by a denial of recovery."9 Furthermore, allowing the innocent
co-insured to recover by construing the ambiguous policy language
against the company does not conflict with the proposition that
public policy prohibits recovery by an insured who intentionally
burns insured property in order to collect the insurance. From the
standpoint of the innocent co-insured, the loss is clearly fortuitous.
As one court stated, "[t]here is no such policy against insurance to
indemnify an insured against the consequences of a violation of law
by others without his direction or participation, or against his own
negligence, or the negligence of others."8 1
Other factors courts employ to support the presumption of a
joint contract are equally troublesome. For instance, the nature of
the property ownership and the marital relationship of the co-insureds
also serve as a basis for determining contract interests to be joint.2
Where the property is jointly owned, especially through tenancy by
the entirety, the contract is presupposed to be joint because the in-
surable interest, like the property interest, is deemed to be indivisi-
ble.8 This presupposition of a joint contract is bolstered by the no-
tion that a married couple constitutes a single entity under the
law. Since the property interests of a husband and wife are regarded
78. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
79. See Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lebrecht, 104 N.H. 465, 190 A.2d 420
(1963).
80. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
81. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lebrecht, 104 N.H. 465, __, 190 A.2d 420,
423 (1963).
82. Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952);
Cooperation Fire Ins. Assoc. v. Domina, 137 Vt. 3, 399 A.2d 502 (1979); Rockingham
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d 774 (1979). Cf. Bridges v. Commercial
Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (court relies solely on nature
of property ownership and marital relationship). Contra Short v. Oklahoma Farmers
Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1980) (marriage status was held to be irrelevant).
83. See Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952); Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952); Cooperative Fire Ins. Assoc. v. Domina, 137 Vt. 3, __, 399 A.2d 502, 503
(1979); Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 219 Va. 803, __, 250 S.E.2d 774, 776
(1979).
84. Compare Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d
774 (1979) with American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, - Ind. App. -, 426 N.E.2d
136 (1981).
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as inextricably intertwined, the contract interests also are con-
sidered inseparable.
Because an insurance contract does not insure the property
itself,85 the analogy drawn between the interests in the property and
those under the contract is questionable. The proceeds of an in-
surance contract are personalty and are held in the same way as
"any personal property voluntarily acquired."86 Although the value
of the insurance proceeds and that of the property are similar, the
proceeds of an insurance policy are not a substitute for the prop-
erty. 7 Finally, the reliance on archaic legal fictions, such as the
marital "unit" and tenancy by the entirety, is untenable" in light of
the Married Women's Acts89 and the numerous changes in the legal
treatment of marriage and marital property."
Premised on anachronistic and outmoded concepts, the old rule
has proven to be "harsh and inequitable . . . [and] . . . in need of re-
examination."9 For example, in Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Union
85. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
86. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, __, 192 N.E.2d 20, 22, 242
N.Y.S.2d 50, - (1963). See Forsyth County v. Plemmons, 2 N.C. App. 373, __ 163
S.E.2d 97, 99 (1968). For a complete listing of those states which recognize tenancy by
the entirety, see Grilliot & Yocum, Tenancy By The Entirety: An Ancient Fiction
Frustrates Modern Creditors, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 341, 354-61 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Grilliot & Yocum). See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
87. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, __ 192 N.E.2d 20, 22, 242
N.Y.S.2d 50, __ (1962). 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 22.
88. See Erlin Lawler Enter., Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 267 Cal. App. 2d 381, 73
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1968) (mere family relationship of arsonist does not bar recovery when
there is no benefit); Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d 240,
159 N.W.2d 89 (1968) (a husband and wife are still individuals and are responsible for
their own acts). Tenancy by the entirety has also been extensively criticized as being
an irrational and outmoded legal fiction. Appeal of Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 22-23, 33 A.
652, 654 (1895). Grilliot & Yocum, supra note 86. See also D'ercole v. D'ercole, 407 F.
Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976) (§ 1983 challenge to the common law concept of tenancy by
the entirety); Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583 (D. Mass. 1973) (§ 1983 discrimination
based upon statutory preclusion to partitioning of land held by tenants by the
entirety).
89. In some jurisdictions, the Married Women's Acts have been held to
abolish tenancy by the entirety. Annot. 141 A.L.R. 179, 181 & n. 18 (1941). In others,
Married Women's Acts abolish tenancy by the entirety only as to personalty. Id. at
182 & n. 19. "The Married Women's Acts, by lifting at least with respect to the taking
and holding of property, the disabilities of coverture, removed the legal unity from
which the estate by the entities was implied." Id. at 186 & n. 30.
90. See generally Glendon, The New Marriage and the New Property, 13
FAM. L.Q. 441-60 (1980); Thomas, Changing American Family: Can the Courts Catch
Up?, 6 PEPPERDINE L.R. 733-49 (1979).
91. Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, 363 So. 2d 751, 753 (Ala. 1978); American
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Insurance Co.," the husband set fire to property which was jointly
owned and insured, but had been awarded to the wife in a divorce
proceeding before the husband's act of arson. Although the court
noted that the marit;il status of the insureds was irrelevant, it
denied recovery to the innocent wife stating that it was flatly
against public policy to give funds to the entity of which the ar-
sonist was a member.9 3 Thus, the court precluded recovery under
the contract by the innocent joint insured owning property jointly
with the arsonist. Obviously, the court was concerned with allowing
a benefit to the wrongdoer. Nevertheless, there is no reason why
the court could not have achieved the same result by giving the pro-
ceeds to the innocent spouse through a constructive trust or some
other device which would preclude any benefit to the wrongdoer. At
any rate, the weaknesses of the old rule demonstrate the impro-
priety of a property or strict contract law analysis to ascertain the
innocent co-insured spouse's right to recover. The shortcomings of
the old rule led some courts to reevaluate their approach to the prob-
lem of the innocent co-insured. Eventually, a second approach, the
"rebuttable presumption" theory, emerged which attempts to pro-
vide a fairer result. However, the "rebuttable presumption" theory
also relies on property law and therefore is incapable of properly ad-
dressing the question of the innocent co-insured's right to recover.
An Attempt at Fairness: The Rebuttable Presumption Theory
Recognizing that an absolute bar to recovery often resulted in
grave injustice, courts sought to provide a more equitable alterna-
tive to the old rule. Consequently, the rebuttable presumption
theory was created to afford the innocent co-insured an opportunity
to refute the old rule's conclusive presumption of a joint contract.
This change in the courts' approach to the problem of the innocent
co-insured originated in 1942 with Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire In-
surance Co."
In Hoyt, a fire insurance policy was issued to three persons
who held the insured property as tenants in common. Rejecting the
argument that a policy issued to all of the tenants creates a joint
obligation, the court held that:
Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, - Ind. App. 426 N.E.2d 136, 139 (1981);
Ijames v. Republic Ins. Co., 33 Mich. App. 541, __, 190 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1941).
92. 619 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1980).
93. Id. at 590. See supra note 74.
94. 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942).
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[wihether the rights of obligees are joint or several is a
question of construction, and in construing an insurance
contract, the test is not what the insurance company in-
tended the words of the policy to mean but what a reason-
able person in the position of the insured would have
understood them to mean. 5
By altering the focus of the inquiry to that of the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured," the Hoyt decision nullified the old rule's con-
clusive presumption of a joint contract. 7
After Hoyt, a number of courts recognized the harshness of the
old rule." The imputation of fraud on an innocent insured began to
outweigh the concern for a possible benefit to the wrongdoer." Ac-
cordingly, in some jurisdictions the innocent co-insured spouse is
allowed to rebut the presumption of a joint obligation by proving his
or her interests in the property to be severable."'0 Thus, the innocent
spouse must show "sole or major and separable interest" in the in-
sured property.'
95. Id. at - , 29 A.2d at 123 (citations omitted).
96. In Hoyt, the court observed that "[tihe ordinary person owning an un-
divided interest in the property, not versed in the nice distinctions of insurance law,
would naturally suppose that his individual interest in the property was covered by a
policy which named him without qualification as one of the persons insured." Id.
97. The old rule can avoid Hoyt by relying upon the nature of the property in-
terests involved and the marital relationship of the co-insureds. American Economy
Ins. Co. v. Liggett, __ Ind. App. , -, 426 N.E.2d 136, 139 (1981).
98. See, e.g., Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398 (Del.
1978); Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Warren, 71 Il. App. 3d 625, 390 N.E.2d 361 (1979);
Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973), modified, 130
N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974) (per curiam).
99. Auto Owners Ins. co. v. Eddinger, 366 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Economy Fire & Gas. Co. v. Warren, 71 Ill. App. 3d 625, 390 N.E.2d 361 (1979);
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, - Ind. App. , 426 N.E.2d 136 (1981);
Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 441 Mich. 267, 307 N.W.2d 53 (1981), rev'g, 91 Mich.
App. 49, 282 N.W.2d 829 (1979).
100. In Alabama, California, Michigan and Tennessee, the innocent co-insured
is permitted to rebut the presumption of a joint contract. See Hosey v. Seibels Bruce
Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1978); Erlin Lawler Enter., Inc. v. Fire Ins.
Exchg., 267 Cal. App. 2d 381, 73 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1968); Simon v. Security Ins. Co., 390
Mich. 72, 210 N.W.2d 322 (1973); Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., - Tenn. App. - , 610
S.W.2d 428 (1980). In Michigan, the opportunity to rebut the presumption of a joint
contract, see Simon v. Security Ins. Co., 390 Mich. 72, 210 N.W.2d 322 (1973) (dealt
with personal property), may no longer be good law in light of Morgan v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 411 Mich. 267, 307 N.W.2d 53 (1981), rev'g, 91 Mich. App. 49, 282 N.W.2d 829
(1979).
101. Simon, 390 Mich. at - , 210 N.W.2d at 327. See also Hosey v. Seibels
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The logic behind the rebuttable presumption theory is nonethe-
less ill-founded. While the loss is viewed from the standpoint of the
innocent co-insured, the theory is ultimately based upon a property
rationale. Like the old rule, the rebuttable presumption rule "rests
on a perceived link between co-ownership of property and a joint
contractual obligation."' ' Yet, the decisions acknowledge the imma-
teriality of the marital relationship, which bolstered the property ra-
tionale under the old rule, to the disposition of the innocent spouse's
right to recover. ' Here, by demonstrating the severability of the
property interests, the innocent spouse destroys the perceived link
between the nature of the property ownership and the contractual
obligations, and thus can recover under the policy. However, it is
not entirely clear from the case law how the innocent spouse might
demonstrate severability of interest, especially where entireties prop-
erty is involved."" Perhaps the opportunity to rebut the joint con-
tract presumption is a compromise between the desire to avoid a
benefit to the wrongdoer and the indemnification objectives of the
insurance contract. Despite its attempt to rectify the injustices of
the old rule, the theory still suffers from some of the same infirmi-
ties. For example, the tortious conduct of one spouse is effectively
attributed to the innocent spouse and recovery is barred if the lat-
ter cannot prove the divisibility of their property interests. Further-
more, the property rationale ignores the nature and extent of the
parties' rights and duties as governed by the insurance contract.
While the rebuttable presumption theory does not go as far as does
the new line of authority, it is at least an attempt to ameliorate the
inequities of the old rule.
The New Dominant Rule: The Best Reasoned Rule
Within the last four years, a new line of authority has
emerged which ameliorates the infirmities of the old rule and
the rebuttable presumption theory. This new rule permits the inno-
cent co-insured to recover irrespective of whether the interests in
the property are joint or several.'0 5 Often referred to as the best
Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1978); Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co.,
Tenn. App. -, 610 S.W.2d 428 (1980).
102. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. co. v. Molloy, - Md. 433 A.2d
1135, 1140 (1981).
103. Hosey, 363 So. 2d 751; Erlin Lawler Enter. Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exch., 267 Cal.
App. 2d 381, 73 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1968). See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 101. See also infra note 144.
105. Recovery under the new dominant rule is permitted regardless of the
form of property ownership: Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Karstone, 510 F. Supp. 856
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reasoned rule,"' this new line of authority is rapidly replacing the
old rule.
The first case to expound the new rule was Howell v. Ohio
Casualty Insurance Co. 107 In Howell, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's determination that the fraud of a husband does not
preclude his innocent co-insured wife from collecting the proceeds
under a fire insurance policy. In upholding the decision of the lower
court,"8 the appellate court added that it reached its decision ir-
respective of whether the property or contract interests were joint
or several. Instead, the court declared the "significant factor" to be
that the "responsibility or liability for the fraud-here, the arson-is
several and separate rather than joint, and the husband's fraud can-
not be attributed or imputed to the wife who is not implicated there-
in.""' 9 Finally, the court noted that, although not controlling, ambigu-
ities in the policy language supported its conclusion."'
(D.C. Cal. 1981) (joint tenancy); Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d
398 (Del. 1978) (tenancy by the entirety); Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Eddinger, 366 So. 2d
123 (Fla. App. 1979) (tenancy in common); Economy Fire and Cas. Co. v. Warren, 71 Ill.
App. 3d 625, 390 N.E.2d 361 (1979) (joint tenancy); American Economy Ins. Co. v. Lig-
gett, __ Ind. App. -, 426 N.E.2d 136 (1981) (tenancy by the entirety); Hildebrand
v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978) (joint tenancy); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. v. Molloy, - Md. -, 433 A.2d 1135 (1981) (tenants by the entirety);
Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974) (tenancy by the
entirety); Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 95 N.M. 257, 620 P.2d 1282 (1980) (community prop-
erty); Winter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 497, 409 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct.,
Special Term 1978) (tenancy by the entirety); Lovell v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 302
N.C. 150, 274 S.E.2d 170 (1981), rev'g 46 N.C. App. 150, 264 S.E.2d 743 (1980) (tenancy
by the entirety).
106. Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398 (Del. 1978);
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, __ Ind. App. -, 426 N.E.2d 136 (1981);
Winter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 497, 409 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. Special
Term, 1978); Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., - Tenn. App. , 610 S.W.2d 428 (1980).
107. 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973), modified, 130 N.J. Super. 350,
327 A.2d 240 (1974) (per curiam).
108. The trial court held that "the rights and interests under this policy can be
said to be several, not joint, and thus not subject to divestment or forfeiture by the
unilateral actions of one spouse." Howell, 124 N.J. Super 414, __, 307 A.2d 142, 145
(1972).
109. 130 N.J. Super. 350, __, 327 A.2d 240, 242 (1974).
110. Specifically, the Howell court stated:
The "Named Insured" is the husband "and/or" plaintiff wife. Al-
though the term "Insured" means the named insured, the use of the am-
biguous phrase "and/or" and the reasonable expectations of the insureds
by reason thereof compel a determination that the fraudulent conduct by
one insured should not void the policy as to the other who is completely
innocent thereof.
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The Howell decision has been instrumental in the development
of the new line of authority."' However, both Howell." and its pro-
geny are unclear as to whether they focus on the severability of the
contract rights or the liability for fraud to determine the innocent
spouse's rights.
If the courts were to focus solely on the fact that the liability
for fraud is separate, recovery would be permitted regardless of the
nature of the contract interests. Thus, whenever fraud by an in-
sured is involved, the innocent co-insured could recover irrespective
of whether the contract interests were joint or several. If contract
interests were the sole basis of recovery, then even if fraud was in-
volved, the innocent co-insured would not be entitled to recover
where the contract interests were found to be joint. At any rate, the
courts employ both factors in holding that the innocent spouse is en-
titled to recover, thereby reaching the most equitable result under
the circumstances. Recovery under the new dominant rule thus is
grounded on the fact that the contract rights and the fraud liability
are deemed to be divisible regardless of the nature of the property
interests.
Pursuant to the new dominant rule, neither property law nor
the existence of the marital relationship is relevant to the innocent
spouse's rights."' Furthermore, the policy against imputing liability
for fraud on an innocent person is significantly more important than
the possibility of a potential benefit to the wrongdoer."4 Courts
111. Excluding the Howell decision itself, seven out of the eleven remaining
courts comprising the new dominant rule cite to Howell as support for holding that the
innocent co-insured is entitled to recover. See supra note 105.
112. In Howell, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court
which held the interests in the property and in the contract to be several. See supra
note 108. However, the appellate court seemed to place more emphasis on the fact that
the liability for fraud was separate. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Thus,
it is unclear as to which of the two, separate fraud liability or separate contract and
property interests, is the significant factor.
113. Neither property interests nor the marital status of the co-insureds is
relevant because "[t]he unity of person of husband and wife (expressed through the
tenancy by entirety) gives no clue to the relationship that ought properly to obtain be-
tween the owners of the proceeds of insurance." Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 124 N.J.
Super. 414, __, 307 A.2d 142, 144 (1973) quoting Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13
N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (1963). Furthermore, "[m]arried people are still individuals and respon-
sible for their own acts." Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d
240, __, 159 N.W.2d 89, 93 (1968).
114. Imposition of liability for fraud on an innocent person is contrary to the
American system of justice which is premised on individual responsibility for miscon-
duct. American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, __ Ind. App. , -, 426 N.E.2d 136,
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recognize the fundamental injustice of barring recovery under the
circumstances because the reasonable person does not expect arson
to be imputed as a result of the intentional acts of the spouse.
Hence, liability under the fraud clause is several as to each insured
under the policy. This same result also is attained through the use
of traditional rules of insurance contract construction.
The decision to grant recovery under a contract analysis turns
on the policy language and the contract law applicable to that
language. In the policy's fraud provision, the term "the insured" is
found to be ambiguous and capable of two or more interpretations.'
Since the reasonable person would believe that his individual in-
terest in the property is covered," 6 the contract is construed against
the insurer and the contract interests under the policy are held to
be divisible."7 Hence, insurance contract law and adhesion contract
theories supply the basis for ruling that the innocent spouse is en-
titled to recover where there is no clear policy language to the con-
trary.
It is the combination of insurance contract principles and con-
cerns for equity that renders this new line of authority to be the
best reasoned rule. Holding the contract interests and fraud liability
to be severable effectuates the reasonable expectations of the or-
dinary purchaser of insurance."' By allowing the innocent co-insured
to recover, avoiding a forfeiture, the purpose of an insurance con-
tract, which is to provide indemnity against loss, is thereby pro-
moted."9
Despite the fact that the new dominant rule mitigates the harsh-
ness and inequities of the other two theories, it nonetheless has
140 (1981); Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lebrecht, 104 N.H. 465, __, 190 A.2d 420, 423
(1963). Some courts also note that there is no danger of a benefit to the wrongdoer
anyway. American Economy Ins., __ Ind. App. at __ 426 N.E.2d at 144; Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kartsone, 510 F. Supp. 856, 859 (D.C. Cal. 1981).
115. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Eddinger, 366 So. 2d 123 (Fla. App. 1979);
American Economy Ins., __ Ind. App. -, 426 N.E.2d 136 (1981).
116. Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242. -, 29 A.2d 121, 123
(1942).
117. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Some courts use the
Pawtucket rationale and define the term "the insured" in the fraud provision as apply-
ing only to the insured who defrauds the insurer and attempts to make a claim.
Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978); Morgan v. Cincin-
nati Ins. Co., 411 Mich. 267, 307 N.W.2d 53 (1981); Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Lebrecht, 104 N.H. 465, __, 190 A.2d 420, 423 (1963).
118. See supra notes 40, 95, 116-17 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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shortcomings of its own. In particular, the new rule is too overpro-
tective of the marital relationship in its attempt to achieve the most
equitable results. ' Even though the courts disclaim its relevancy,"'
the marital relationship is undoubtedly a factor in the courts' treat-
ment of the liability for the fraudulent conduct of the guilty spouse.
It is at this point that the courts often confuse tort law with con-
tract law principles." As previously noted, it is not clear whether
the focus of the new rule is on the liability for fraud or on the
nature of the contract rights."' The issue in these actions concerns
the nature and extent of the contractual obligations under the in-
surance policy," 4 not whether the denial of recovery is tantamount
to an imputation of vicarious liability based on the marital relation-
ship. Furthermore, the new rule ignores the realities of the marital
relationship. The new rule is essentially an invitation to collusion
and creates "the virtually insurmountable obstacle of proving both
the arson of one spouse, and the conspiracy between spouses in
order to defeat recovery in the first instance."'25 Thus, in reality, the
decision to grant a right of recovery generates some unfavorable
side effects.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
While the new dominant rule avoids the difficulties that plagued
the first two theories," the decision to grant a right of recovery
also gives rise to various practical problems. A major concern that
accompanies the decision to grant recovery is spousal complicity.
Often the innocence of the so-called "innocent" spouse is not always
certain."' Under the new dominant rule, the "innocent" co-insured is
120. See generally Butler & Freeman, The Innocent Coinsured, supra note 60.
121. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
122. See Butler & Freeman, The Innocent Coinsured, supra note 60, at 206.
123. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124. See e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, __ Md. ...
433 A.2d 1135, 1140 (1981), where the court stated:
Whether an innocent co-insured, notwithstanding his or her
spouse's misconduct, can recover under an insurance contract, depends
primarily upon whether the parties intended, and thus whether the con-
tract contemplates, the obligations of the co-insureds to be joint or
several. To hold otherwise would be to deny the parties to agreements in-
suring jointly owned property the ability to determine the nature of the
co-insureds' contractual interests and obligations.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Lovell v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 302 N.C. 150, __,
274 S.E.2d 170, 173 (1981).
125. Butler & Freeman, The Innocent Coinsured, supra note 60, at 210.
126. See supra 113-19 and accompanying text.
127. In Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1978),
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certain to recover unless the insurer can successfully challenge his
or her alleged innocence.'28 Such being the case, all insurers can be
expected to investigate the possibility of spousal complicity "since
on that basis they could quickly and with impunity deny coverage
altogether.""' Arson is a difficult crime to investigate and prove but
"proof of complicity in arson is even more difficult"'"3 because often
there is a lack of any concrete evidence or eyewitnesses.
When investigating the potential of spousal complicity, it is
often appropriate to examine the status of the marriage at the time
of the fire. Suspicion of complicity will vary depending upon
whether the fraudulent spouse dies in the fire, the couple is divorced
or the marriage is on-going. 3 ' Obviously, where the fraudulent
spouse dies as a result of the arson, there is no danger of any subse-
quent benefit to the wrongdoer if the "innocent" spouse is allowed
to collect the proceeds. 3 ' Despite strong suspicions of guilt, the
alleged innocence of the "innocent" spouse will probably go un-
challenged unless there is direct proof of collusion. The threat of
litigation for a bad-faith refusal to pay a claim "is strong incentive
there was evidence that Mr. Hosey had been moving furniture out of the house on the
afternoon prior to the fire. Letter from Alan C. Livingston, Attorney at Law, to Leane
M. English (Feb. 15, 1982). Also, in Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d
329 (Me. 1978), Mr. Hildebrand put the house in his wife's name about eighteen months
prior to the fire. Later the family moved to the beach for the summer, taking with
them many of their personal belongings. The house was destroyed by fire several
nights later. Based upon these facts, Mrs. Hildebrand was suspected of collusion but
there was no direct evidence of involvement that would implicate her. Letter from
Theodore H. Kurtz, Attorney at Law, to Leane M. English (Feb. 22, 1982).
128. See Wilson v. Concordia Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1972) (husband and wife barred from recovery as joint enterprisers). See
supra Taylor, note 9, at 197.
129. Letter from Miriam Gerber, Attorney at Law, to Leane M. English (Feb.
23, 1982).
130. Letter from Alan C. Livingston, Attorney at Law, to Leane M. English
(Feb. 15, 1982).
131. The marriages involved are often atypical. See, e.g., Steigler v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 348 A.2d 398 (Del. 1978) (Mr. Steigler was convicted of assault
with intent to commit murder against his wife in connection with the arson).
132. American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, -, Ind. App. -, 426 N.E.2d
136 (1981); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kartsone, 510 F. Supp. 856 (D.C. Cal. 1981); Howell
v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973), modified, 130 N.J.
Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974). Other relationships in which the possibility of a benefit
to the wrongdoer is considered are trustor-trustee, landlord-tenant, and in the cor-
porate context. See e.g., Mercantile Trust Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 376
F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1967) (trustor-trustee); Erlin Lawler Enter. Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
267 Cal. App. 2d 381, 73 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1968) (corporation).
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for the insurance company to settle with its insured unless it had
strong evidence of guilt."'"
Because complicity in arson is difficult to prove and recovery is
the most equitable result under the circumstances, it is questionable
whether coverage will ever be denied. Furthermore, a subsequent
benefit to the wrongdoer is always a distinct possibility when the
fraudulent spouse is still alive.3 ' Insurance companies are clearly
disadvantaged under the new dominant rule. One possible solution
helps to alleviate these practical problems.
The burden of proof should be shifted to the "innocent" spouse
to establish his or her lack of involvement in the fraudulent acts of
the other spouse. Since complicity in arson is so difficult to detect,
the burden placed on the insurance companies to prove collusion in
order to deny coverage is inordinate. Therefore, once the insurer
has proven the fire to have been of incendiary origin, the spouse
seeking coverage under the policy would be obligated to prove his
or her innocence. Congress has already enacted a statute pursuant
to which an innocent spouse who is subject to federal income tax
liability as a result of omissions of income from a joint return may
prove that he or she had no knowledge of the omission. "5 Under 26
U.S.C. § 6013(d)(3), a husband and wife who file a joint tax return are
jointly and severally liable for the tax due on their combined in-
comes. Recognizing the grave injustices that result from an imposi-
tion of joint liability upon an innocent spouse, Congress enacted 26
U.S.C. § 6013(e) in 1971 which relieves an innocent spouse of federal
income liability if he or she establishes a lack of knowledge of the
omission and if under the circumstances, taking into consideration
direct or indirect benefits to the innocent spouse from the items
omitted, imposition of liability would be inequitable." Perhaps a
similar piece of legislation could best accomplish a shift in the
burden of proving spousal complicity by the insurer to that of prov-
ing innocence by the spouse seeking coverage under the policy. This
133. Letter from Alan C. Livingston, Attorney at Law, to Leane M. English
(Feb. 15, 1982). See also, Chavers v. National See. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala.
1981); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973); Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Kartsone, 510 F. Supp. 856 (1981).
134. In Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., __ Tenn. App. -, 610 S.W.2d 428
(1980), Mr. and Mrs. Ryan reconciled shortly after Mr. Ryan was permitted to recover
under the policy. Letter from William H. Crawford, Jr., Attorney at Law, to Leane M.
English (Feb. 11, 1982).
135. 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e) (1980).
136. 26 U.S.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B),(C) (1980). See S. REP. 91-1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
3, reprinted in (1970) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089.
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shift in responsibility affords the "innocent" spouse with an oppor-
tunity to escape joint liability and lessens the likelihood that the in-
surer will be defrauded.
Perhaps the best solution to the entire problem is to revise the
policy language. If the insurance companies intend the fraudulent
acts of one spouse to void the policy as to both, the policy should be
redrafted to reflect this position. 1' The desired result could be ob-
tained by substituting the term "the" insured in the fraud provision
with "a," "any" or "an" insured." Drafting the policy to expressly
deny recovery not only serves the interests of the insurance com-
panies but also advances the public good by discouraging fraud."3 9
These solutions serve separate functions: the first is a defen-
sive measure whereas the second is preventive. Yet, both protect
the insurer from being victimized by potentially fraudulent claims.
Having decided that the innocent co-insured may recover on
the fire insurance policy, courts must then determine the extent to
which he or she is entitled to recover. Although the most equitable
result is desired, courts do not want their decisions to encourage
arson-for-profit. Thus, a proper evaluation of the innocent
co-insured's interests in the policy is necessary to a just result. Un-
fortunately, there is a lack of unanimity in rationale among the
courts in determining the extent to which an innocent co-insured is
entitled to recover. Some courts refer to the interests in the real
estate to ascertain the extent of recovery"" while others look to the
137. This suggestion is also made by the courts. See, e.g., Economy Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Warren, 71 Ill. App. 3d 625, 390 N.E.2d 361 (1979); Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins.
Co., - Tenn. App. , 610 S.W.2d 428 (1980).
138. See Comment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to Insurance Recovery, supra note
32, at 549-54.
139. See discussion of the contract revision solution in Butler & Freeman, The
Innocent Coinsured, supra note 60, at 211, where the authors observed:
This approach should satisfy those jurisdictions that have attacked
the provisions of the policy based on the reasonable expectations of the
insured. Nothing can be drafted to force a court to not employ a "public
policy" rationale, but the proposed exclusion should help bring the reason-
ing of the courts back into the arena of contract law, instead of tort and
criminal law.
Another method of discouraging arson-for-profit is to recommend that those who
collect on fire insurance claims be encouraged to repair or replace the building instead
of taking the cash and "walking." See Fighting Arson by Removing the Profit Motive,
Bus. WK., May 21, 1979, at 68. Allowing the innocent co-insured to recover can also
prevent certain frauds, such as conspiracy. See Comment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to
Insurance Recovery, supra note 32, at 555 n. 73.
140. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kartsone, 510 F. Supp. 856 (D.C. Cal. 1981);
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interests in the insurance contract.' Again, in this context, courts
disagree as to whether property law or insurance contract principles
should govern the inquiry into the amount of recovery. 2
Under a property law analysis, the courts equate the interests
in the insurance proceeds with those in the real estate. Where the
property interests are severable, valuation of the innocent co-
insured's interests in the insurance proceeds presents no problem.'4
However, valuation of the interests in the proceeds is a complicated
task where the property is held by the entireties and the interests
are regarded as inseparable.' Recovery by the innocent co-insured
tenant by the entirety is barred because the extent of his or her in-
terests in the proceeds cannot be determined." Thus, a property
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, - Ind. App. , 426 N.E.2d 136 (1981);
Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 95 N.M. 257, 620 P.2d 1282 (1980). The courts following the
"rebuttable presumption" theory also use the property interests to determine the ex-
tent of the interests in the proceeds. Hosey v. Seibels Bruce Group, S.C. Ins. Co., 363
So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1978); Simon v. Security Ins. Co., 390 Mich. 72, 210 N.W.2d 322 (1973);
Ryan v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., __ Tenn. App. -, 610 S.W.2d 428 (1980).
141. Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398 (Del. 1978);
Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973), modified, 130
N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974) (per curiam); Winter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 96
Misc. 2d 497, 409 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct., Special Term 1978); Hawthorne v. Hawthorne,
13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242, N.Y.S.2d 50 (1963).
142. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
143. In some cases' valuation of the interests in the property is not difficult
because of the form of ownership. See, e.g., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Eddinger, 366 So.
2d 123 (Fla. App. 1979) (property held as tenants in common). Furthermore, valuation
under the "rebuttable presumption" theory is simplified because the innocent co-
insured must first show sole or major interest in the property in order to recover. The
extent of the property interests are therefore ascertained. See supra note 140.
144. See supra note 104. In Cooperative Fire Ins. Assoc. v. Domina, 137 Vt. 3,
399 A.2d 502 (1979), the court stated that even assuming that the fraudulent acts of
the husband could not bar recovery by the innocent wife, "nevertheless her interest in
the property as tenants by the entirety is such that the extent thereof cannot be
determined." Id. at __, 399 A.2d at 503. It is interesting to note that in both Liggett
and Safeco, the courts were able to determine the extent of the interests in the in-
sured property even though the property was held by the entirety and as joint tenants
with right of survivorship respectively because in both cases the fraudulent spouse
died in the fire. Consequently, the courts determined that at the time of the fire the
innocent spouse's interest extended to the whole estate and full recovery was granted.
Perhaps, if the fraudulent spouse had lived, both Liggett and Safeco may have
resulted in a bar to recovery for the same reason that the Domina court barred
recovery.
145. The argument that the interests in entireties estates are indeterminable
seems tenuous in light of the fact that courts in general, and divorce courts in par-
ticular, are able to divide them. See e.g., Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532,
245 S.E.2d 87 (1978); Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 578, 89 S.E.2d 122 (1955).
In Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 95 N.M. 257, 620 P.2d 1282 (1980), the court observed
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law theory works as much of a hardship here as it does when used
to determine the innocent co-insured's right to recover.1""
An insurance policy is a personal contract of indemnity and
does not insure the property itself.'47 Although the insured must
have an insurable interest in the property in order to recover under
the policy,'48 the proceeds are not a substitute for the realty.'49
Rather, the proceeds are a product of the contractual relationship
between the insurer and the insured, and as such, are severable as
voluntarily acquired personal property.' Since the insurance con-
tract rights are separate and the proceeds are segregable, recovery
that "New Mexico courts have segregated out the interests in community property
when it has been necessary to do so in order to avoid injustice." Id. at __, 620 P.2d
at 1284.
146. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. Use of tenancy by the en-
tirety is inappropriate to analyze the rights of the innocent co-insured spouse. Since
the tenancy was originally designed to protect marriage and the marital home against
creditors, use of the tenancy under the circumstances acts to frustrate justice.
American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, __ Ind. App. - , . 426 N.E.2d 136, 140
(1981). Generally, the tenancy has been criticized as outdated and out of step with
modern day social and economic conditions. Grilliot & Yocum, supra note 86. For
criticisms of the use of tenancy by the entirety to bar recovery in other areas, see
Fort Lee Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Li Butti, 106 N.J. Super. 211, 214, 254 A.2d 804, 806
(1969) (dissenting opinion), subsequently adopted in, 55 N.J. 532, 264 A.2d 33 (1970) (per
curiam) (surplus monies from mortgage foreclosure sale); King v. Greene, 30 N.J. 395,
413, 153 A.2d 49, __ (1959) (dissenting opinions) (proceeds of an execution sale).
147. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
148. 4 APPLEMAN, supra note 22, at § 2121 (Rev. ed. 1969). An interest in the
insured property is required because of the policy against wager contracts. Id.
149. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50
(1963). See also Fort Lee Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Li Butti, 106 N.J. Super. 211, 215-16,
254 A.2d 804, 807-08 (1969) (dissenting opinion, Carton, J.).
150. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50
(1963). 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 194 (1969). Personal property is divisible because it
is held as tenants in common in those jurisdictions where personalty cannot be held by
the entireties. However, classification of insurance proceeds as personalty and,
therefore, separable will not work in those jurisdictions where tenancy by the en-
tireties is recognized in personalty. See Grilliot & Yocum, supra note 86, at 354-61 (fif-
teen states recognize tenancy by the entirety in personalty). Consequently, the same
problem of indeterminable interests arises with personalty as it does with real estate.
See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. Most notably, in those jurisdictions
where recovery was barred because the proceeds were said to be a substitute for the
real estate, tenancy by the entirety is recognized in personalty. Once again, tenancy by
the entirety will work a hardship on the innocent co-insured spouse if used to bar
recovery even under the personalty rationale. Under the circumstances, a denial of
coverage would still impose liability for fraud on an innocent spouse. See also Com-
ment, Spouse's Fraud as a Bar to Insurance Recovery, supra note 32, at 554-55. In one
jurisdiction under the new dominant rule where personalty may be held by the en-
tireties, recovery was allowed based upon the fact that since the contract rights were
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is granted to the extent of the innocent co-insured's interests which
is held to be one-half of the total amount of the proceeds. 5'
Allowing the innocent spouse to recover to the extent of his or
her contract interests is consistent with the purpose of an insurance
contract which is to provide indemnity. Moreover, a contract law
analysis avoids the difficulties inherent in a property law theory
where the extent of recovery is subject to such legal fictions as the
estate by the entirety and the notion that husband and wife are one
person. Insurance contract principles accommodate modern day con-
ditions and, therefore, produce the most equitable results.
CONCLUSION
Although an absolute bar to recovery by an innocent co-insured
was once the dominant rule, it is rapidly being replaced by a new
line of authority. Currently, fourteen jurisdictions allow recovery to
an innocent co-insured whose property interests are severable from
those of the other insured. In ten of these jurisdictions, recovery is
allowed regardless of the nature of the property interests. Seven
jurisdictions still bar recovery by an "innocent" co-insured where
the property is jointly owned."2 The new dominant rule focuses on
the nature of the insurance contract interests along with the notion
of individual responsibility for misconduct. The new rule also per-
mits the innocent co-insured to recover regardless of the property
interests involved. This is the most equitable approach to the ques-
tion of an innocent co-insured spouse's right to recover. Finally,
although the new rule also has some shortcomings, these problems
can be resolved by contract revisions and a shift in the burden of
proof of complicity."' In conclusion, if courts continue to follow the
new dominant rule, some safeguards, such as those recommended,
must be devised so that the most equitable result will be achieved
for both the insurer and the insured.
Leane English Cerven
separate, "both logic and justice require that the amount recoverable be likewise
allocated." Steigler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 384 A.2d at 398, 402 (Del. 1978).
151. See, e.g., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Eddinger, 366 So.2d 123 (Fla. App.
1979); Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973).
152. See, e.g., supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Butler & Freeman, The Innocent Coinsured, supra note 60,
at 211.
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